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On Verifying the Accuracy of Information:
Philosophical Perspectives
Don Fallis
The sooner a man begins to verify all he hears
the better it is for him.
—George Gurdjieff
Trust but verify.
—Ronald Reagan
Abstract
How can one verify the accuracy of recorded information
(e.g., information found in books, newspapers, and on Web sites)? In this
paper, I argue that work in the epistemology of testimony (especially that
of philosophers David Hume and Alvin Goldman) can help with this im-
portant practical problem in library and information science. This work
suggests that there are four important areas to consider when verifying the
accuracy of information: (i) authority, (ii) independent corroboration, (iii)
plausibility and support, and (iv) presentation. I show how philosophical
research in these areas can improve how information professionals go about
teaching people how to evaluate information. Finally, I discuss several fur-
ther techniques that information professionals can and should use to make
it easier for people to verify the accuracy of information.
Philosophy of Information (PI)
PI is “the philosophical ﬁeld concerned with the critical investigation
of the conceptual nature and basic principles of information, including its
dynamics, utilisation, and sciences” (Floridi, 2002b, p. 123).1  Luciano Flo-
ridi (2002a) and Ken Herold (2001) recently looked at the broad connec-
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tions between library and information science (LIS) and PI. For example,
Floridi (2002a, pp. 47–48) considers whether PI might serve as the theo-
retical foundation for which library and information scientists have long
been searching. Of course, it is somewhat rare for philosophers to explicit-
ly address LIS issues.2  Also, PI has only recently been identiﬁed as a distinct
ﬁeld of inquiry. Even so, philosophers have been working on many issues
of concern to LIS for centuries (cf. Floridi, 2002a, p. 44).
This paper focuses on how PI can help with one speciﬁc practical con-
cern for LIS, namely, how one can verify the accuracy of recorded infor-
mation. In other words, how one can determine if the information found
in a book, in a newspaper, on a Web site, etc. is accurate.
Notably, library and information scientists typically talk about evaluat-
ing the quality of information rather than about verifying the accuracy of
information (see, e.g., Alexander & Tate, 1999; Cooke, 1999). In fact, ac-
curacy is usually just one of the traditional criteria for evaluating the qual-
ity of information (see, e.g., Alexander & Tate, 1999, pp. 11–13; Cooke 1999,
pp. 60–62).
Even for library and information scientists, however, accuracy is the sine
qua non of quality information sources. For example, consider some of the
other traditional criteria for evaluating the quality of information. The main
reason that we are interested in ﬁnding information sources that are au-
thoritative, objective, and current is that we think that they are more likely
to be accurate. In other words, these criteria are indicative of information
quality precisely because they are indicative of information accuracy.
Library and information scientists are legitimately concerned with
quality issues that do go beyond accuracy, such as the accessibility, relevance,
comprehensibility, and navigability of information sources. However, as
Peter Hernon (1995, p. 133) points out, “it is not enough that information
is readily available; before relying on any data or information, it may be
important to ascertain, for example, the veracity of the content.”
In this paper, I appeal mainly to the work of David Hume (1748/1977)
and Alvin Goldman (1999 and 2001) on the epistemology of testimony (as
well as to some work in game theory).3  Their work suggests four important
areas to consider when verifying the accuracy of information: (i) authori-
ty, (ii) independent corroboration, (iii) plausibility and support, and (iv)
presentation. I show how work in these areas can improve how information
professionals go about teaching people how to evaluate information. In
addition, I argue that information professionals can and should use some
further important techniques to make it easier for people to verify the ac-
curacy of information.
The Problem of Inaccurate Information
Even fairly reliable information sources contain some amount of inac-
curate information. Famously, the Chicago Tribune mistakenly reported that
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Dewey had defeated Truman in the 1948 presidential campaign. More re-
cently, Dan Rather mistakenly reported that James Brady had died after
being shot by John Hinkley (cf. Frické 1997, p. 887). However, since almost
anyone can post almost anything on the Internet with no editorial control,
we might expect much more inaccurate information on the Internet.4  In
fact, empirical studies have found a considerable amount of inaccurate
information on the Internet (see, e.g., Impicciatore et al., 1997; Connell &
Tipple, 1999; Berland et al., 2001).5
The reason that inaccurate information is a problem is that people
can often be misled by it. And the risks here are not just epistemic. Peo-
ple use the information that they have to make practical decisions. If
people are misled by inaccurate information, it can cause serious harm
to their ﬁnances (cf. Fowler et al., 2001) and their health (cf. Kiley, 2002).
In addition, while some people may be too credulous, other people may
be too skeptical. Because they are worried about being misled, some peo-
ple may fail to believe accurate information that it would have been beneﬁ-
cial for them to believe.
Of course, the mere fact that an information source contains some
amount of inaccurate information is not necessarily a problem (cf. Wach-
broit, 2000, p. 11). As long as people can distinguish the accurate from the
inaccurate information, they will not be misled. Unfortunately, it often can
be very difﬁcult for people to identify inaccurate information (cf. Cerf,
2002). For example, with the latest Web development software, almost any-
one can publish very professional-looking Web sites. As Silberg et al. (1997,
p. 1244) point out, the Internet “is a medium in which anyone with a com-
puter can serve simultaneously as author, editor, and publisher and can ﬁll
any or all of these roles anonymously if he or she so chooses. In such an
environment, novices and savvy Internet users alike can have trouble dis-
tinguishing the wheat from the chaff, the useful from the harmful.”
Thus, people need to be able to distinguish the accurate information
from the inaccurate information. In other words, they need to be able to
verify the accuracy of information. Since the problem of inaccurate infor-
mation seems to be most pressing on the Internet, this paper focuses speciﬁ-
cally on how to verify the accuracy of information on the Internet. Even so,
almost all of the points that are made can be applied generally to verifying
the accuracy of information from any source.
Library and information scientists have responded to the problem of
inaccurate information on the Internet primarily by publishing guidelines
for evaluating information (see, e.g., Ambre et al., 1997; Silberg et al., 1997;
Wilkinson et al., 1997; Alexander & Tate, 1999; Cooke, 1999; Smith, A.,
2002). These guidelines provide people with a list of features of Web sites
that are supposed to be indicators of accuracy (e.g., the author is identiﬁed,
the author is an authority on the topic, no advertising appears, no spelling
or grammatical errors are present, the Web site is up-to-date, authoritative
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references are cited). As I discuss in the following sections, work on the
epistemology of testimony provides a conceptual framework that encom-
passes such efforts to deal with the problem of inaccurate information. This
conceptual framework explains why these guidelines work and suggests how
they can be improved. In addition, having such a conceptual framework can
make it easier to apply and to communicate these guidelines.
Finally, notably, the problem of inaccurate information is not sui gen-
eris. This problem is analogous to a number of other problems that peo-
ple confront. For example, to deal effectively with the problem of counter-
feit currency, people need to be able to distinguish authentic currency from
counterfeit currency (cf. Bureau of Engraving and Printing, 2002). Simi-
larly, to deal effectively with the problem of low-quality products, consum-
ers need to be able to distinguish high-quality products from low-quality
products (cf. Baird et al., 1994, pp. 122–125). I explain how strategies for
dealing with these other problems have the potential to be heuristically
valuable when we confront the problem of inaccurate information.
The Epistemology of Testimony
The problem of how to verify the accuracy of recorded information is
a special case of the problem of how to verify the accuracy of testimony. For
example, suppose that we want to know the height of the Eiffel Tower. Very
few people have the resources and expertise to measure the Eiffel Tower
for themselves. The rest of us have to look this information up in a book
or on a Web site. But when we get this information from a book or a Web
site, we are relying on the testimony of the author.
The epistemology of testimony is important because a large amount of
the information that we have about the world comes from others rather than
from direct observation (cf. Lipton, 1998, p. 2). As Hume (1748/1977, p.
74) puts it, “there is no species of reasoning more common, more useful,
and even necessary to human life, than that which is derived from the testi-
mony of men, and the reports of eye-witnesses and spectators.” And, in par-
ticular, a large amount of the information that we get from others comes to
us as recorded information (e.g., in books, in newspapers, and on Web sites).
While the epistemology of testimony certainly has not been the main
focus of traditional epistemology (cf. Goldman, 1999, p. 4), a lot of work
has been done in this area (see, e.g., Giedymin, 1963; Hardwig, 1985; Coady,
1992; Lipton, 1998; Goldman, 1999, pp. 103–130; Goldman, 2001;). In fact,
work in this area goes back to the ancient Greeks. Plato (380 BC/2002, p.
170d), for example, asked whether one can “examine another man’s claim
to some knowledge, and make out whether he knows or does not know what
he says he knows.”
One of the most inﬂuential early discussions of the epistemology of
testimony is in David Hume’s An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
(1977), originally published in 1748. In the chapter “Of Miracles,” Hume
467fallis/on verifying the accuracy of information
develops a general framework that can be used to evaluate any kind of tes-
timony. In particular, this framework can be applied to verifying the accu-
racy of recorded information.6
According to Hume (1748/1977, p. 77), “when any one tells me, that
he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself,
whether it be more probable, that this person should either deceive or be
deceived, or that the fact, which he relates, should really have happened.”
Hume is explicitly concerned here with evaluating testimony that a mira-
cle has occurred, but his strategy can just as easily be used to evaluate, for
example, the claim on a Web site that a particular treatment for a child with
a fever is safe and effective. In both cases, we should consider all of the
available evidence (including the fact of the testimony itself) and determine
what the best explanation of this evidence is. This strategy is known as “in-
ference to the best explanation.” Among philosophers, it is a common way
to analyze scientiﬁc inference, but it also can be applied to the evaluation
of testimony (cf. Lipton, 1998, p. 27). For example, what is the best expla-
nation of the fact that the Web site is claiming that this treatment is safe
and effective? Is it more likely that the Web site is promoting an ineffective
treatment either because its author is not medically qualiﬁed or because
the sponsor is selling pharmaceutical products? Alternatively, is it more like-
ly that the treatment really is safe and effective?
In addition to inferring the best explanation, Hume (1748/1977, p. 73)
claims that “a wise man . . . proportions his belief to the evidence.”7  In gen-
eral, if the evidence that a claim is accurate is greater than the evidence that
the claim is inaccurate, then we should be inclined to think that the claim
is accurate (cf. Hume, 1748/1977, pp. 73–74).8  However, our degree of
conﬁdence in the accuracy of the claim should depend on how much the
evidence of accuracy exceeds the evidence of inaccuracy. As Hume (1748/
1977, p. 74) puts it, “a hundred instances or experiments on one side, and
ﬁfty on another, afford a doubtful expectation of any event; though a hun-
dred uniform experiments, with only one contradictory, reasonably beget
a pretty strong degree of assurance.”
But what evidence should we consider when we are trying to verify the
accuracy of a piece of information?9  Hume has several suggestions as to
what evidence is relevant. For example, Hume (1748/1977, p. 75) says that
“we entertain a suspicion concerning any matter of fact, when the witness-
es contradict each other; when they are but few, or of a doubtful charac-
ter; when they have an interest in what they afﬁrm; when they deliver their
testimony with hesitation, or on the contrary, with too violent asseverations”
(cf. Locke, 1690/1975, pp. 662–663). In fact, his suggestions sound a lot
like the published guidelines for evaluating information on the Internet.
The evidence that Hume suggests that people consider can be divided
into roughly four categories. These categories will be examined in more
detail in the following sections. However, before we move on to these de-
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tails, two important points should be emphasized about Hume’s recommen-
dations for evaluating testimony.
First, Hume is engaged in a normative project. That is, he is making
recommendations for how people ought to go about verifying the accura-
cy of information. The published guidelines for evaluating information on
the Internet are also engaged in this same normative project.
By contrast, a number of recent LIS articles (see, e.g., Fogg et al., 2001;
Eysenbach & Köhler, 2002; Rieh, 2002; Wathen & Burkell, 2002) have
looked at how people actually do make judgments about information qual-
ity. Of course, the features of Web sites that people actually ﬁnd credible
need not coincide with the features that they ought to ﬁnd credible. In fact,
determining what people ﬁnd credible is most directly relevant to helping
authors devise ways to convince their audience whether or not what they
are saying is accurate.
Second, the goal of following Hume’s recommendations is that we end
up with true beliefs. In other words, the goal is to acquire beliefs that cor-
respond to reality.10  Philosophers typically take this to be the goal of infor-
mation seekers (see, e.g., Goldman, 1999, p. 3).11  John Locke (1690/1975,
p. 697), for example, explicitly states that the reason that we should pro-
portion our belief to the evidence is so that we will end up with true beliefs.
Library and information scientists, however, are much less likely to take
this to be the goal of information seekers (cf. Fallis, 2000, p. 314). Jesse Shera
(1970, p. 97), for example, says that “false knowledge . . . is still knowledge,
it is knowable and known.” However, as a number of library and informa-
tion scientists have recently argued (see, e.g., Frické, 1997, p. 887; Meola,
2000, p. 174; Doyle, 2001, pp. 62–63;), information seekers often do have
the goal of acquiring true beliefs. For example, a student writing a report
on the Eiffel Tower wants to know how tall the Eiffel Tower really is. In oth-
er words, she is after the truth. Similarly, a parent wants to know whether a
particular treatment for a child with a fever really is safe and effective. In
fact, it does not really make sense for someone to bother about verifying the
accuracy of information unless acquiring true beliefs is her goal.12
Of course, this is not to say that information seekers exclusively seek
true beliefs (cf. Goldman, 1999, p. 26). Walter Kaufmann (1977, pp. 47–
83), for example, argues that the goal of reading should be to acquire more
than just true beliefs (e.g., understanding).13  But even if it is not our ulti-
mate goal, acquiring true beliefs is often a critical means to this further end
(cf. Bruce, 2000, p. 109).
Finally, even if our goal is simply to acquire true beliefs, it is important
to note that we are not just interested in the accuracy of the information.
A person can be misled by incomplete information as well as by inaccurate
information. Thus, we also are interested in the completeness of the infor-
mation (cf. Frické, 1997; Fallis & Frické, 2002, pp. 74–75).14  This paper,
however, focuses speciﬁcally on how to verify the accuracy of information.
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Who Testifies: Authority
Library and information scientists emphasize that people should con-
sider the source of a piece of information when trying to verify its accuracy.
In particular, people are advised to determine the authority of the informa-
tion source (see, e.g., Wilson, 1983; Alexander & Tate, 1999, p. 11; Cooke,
1999, pp. 58–60). This is what Hume (1748/1977, p. 75) had in mind when
he said that we should consider the “character . . . of the witnesses.”
Deciding what to believe based on who said it is referred to by philos-
ophers as an appeal to authority. An appeal to authority is often listed in
introductory logic texts as a fallacy. However, while some appeals to authority
are fallacious (e.g., taking medical advice from someone who plays a doc-
tor on TV), others are legitimate (cf. Salmon, 1995, p. 105; Goldman, 2001,
p. 88).15  An appeal to authority is legitimate whenever our source is likely
to be providing us with accurate information (i.e., if she is a reliable source
on the topic in question).
As Jerzy Giedymin (1963, pp. 288–289) points out, there are essential-
ly two ways to determine whether an information source is reliable. First,
has this information source usually provided accurate information in the
past? If an individual has been right about things in the past, then she is
more likely to be right about things now (cf. Hume, 1748/1977, p. 73).
Second, does anything suggest that this information source would not pro-
vide accurate information in this particular case? For example, the pub-
lished guidelines on evaluating information typically advise people to de-
termine if the information source has an obvious bias (see, e.g., Ambre et
al., 1997; Alexander & Tate, 1999, p. 13).16
Regarding “past track record” (Goldman, 2001, p. 106), many circum-
stances exist where people can directly determine whether an information
source has provided accurate information in the past (cf. Goldman, 2001,
pp. 106–108). For example, while a student may not know how tall the Eiffel
Tower is, she will probably know that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris. Thus, if a
Web site incorrectly claims that the Eiffel Tower is in Brussels, she proba-
bly should not trust this Web site when it claims that the Eiffel Tower is
exactly 300 meters high.
However, a couple of practical difﬁculties arise with trying to directly
determine the past track record of an information source. For one thing,
people may not have had a sufﬁcient number of previous interactions with
this particular information source (cf. Lipton, 1998, p. 15). In fact, given
the size of the Internet, people often will be consulting particular Web sites
for the ﬁrst time. Also, people may not have the expertise to judge the ac-
curacy of the information previously provided by this information source
(cf. Goldman, 2001, p. 106). As a result, if people only rely on their own
past experience with information sources, they will only be able to verify
the accuracy of a limited amount of the information on the Internet.
Fortunately, people also can rely on the experience that other people
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have had with an information source. In other words, people can use the
testimony of others to determine the reliability of an information source
(cf. Goldman, 2001, p. 97). For example, the published guidelines on eval-
uating information typically advise people to determine if the information
source has a reputation for reliability (see, e.g., Wilkinson et al., 1997, p.
55; Cooke, 1999, p. 61). Based on sources’ reputations, someone seeking
ﬁnancial information can be reasonably conﬁdent in the accuracy of infor-
mation found on the Wall Street Journal Web site or the Bloomberg Web site.
In fact, even if an information source does not have a well-established
reputation, other factors can determine if people recommend or endorse
this information source.17  For example, the published guidelines on eval-
uating information typically advise people to determine if the information
source has appropriate credentials (see, e.g., Ambre et al., 1997). As Gold-
man (2001, p. 97) points out, conferring credentials, such as academic
degrees and professional accreditations, is a way in which experts commonly
endorse other experts. In addition, people can determine whether an in-
formation source on the Internet is endorsed by others by looking at how
many Web sites link to this Web site (cf. Burbules, 2001, p. 444). This is
analogous to using citation counts as an indication of the scholarly quality
of a journal (cf. Lee et al., 2002).
Bias is just one of a number of features that might suggest that an in-
formation source would not provide accurate information in a particular
case. As Hume (1748/1977, p. 77) suggests when he says that a witness may
“either deceive or be deceived,” these features fall roughly into two cate-
gories. First, is there any indication that the witness was not sincere in her
testimony?18  Second, is there any indication that the witness was not in a
position to know the fact that she is testifying to? This is a standard distinc-
tion made by philosophers.19  It is basically the same distinction that infor-
mation scientists have in mind when they talk about disinformation and mis-
information (see, e.g., Hernon, 1995, p. 134).
Finally, everything that has been discussed so far in this section (e.g.,
past track record, bias, reputation) is clearly an epistemically relevant con-
sideration. However, philosophers have claimed that some unexpected fea-
tures also might actually help people determine whether an information
source is reliable. For example, Ashley McDowell (2002, pp. 60–61) argues
that the general trustworthiness of an individual (e.g., she keeps her prom-
ises) may be indicative of epistemic trustworthiness. Linda Alcoff (1999)
even argues that the social identity (e.g., culture, race, gender) of an indi-
vidual may have an effect on her epistemic credibility.
How Many Testify: Independent Corroboration
In the last section, we looked at ways to determine the reliability of a
single source of information. However, in addition to the character of the
witness, Hume (1748/1977, p. 75) also notes that people should pay atten-
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tion to the “number of the witnesses.” This is because it is much more like-
ly that one individual will “deceive or be deceived” than that several indi-
viduals will “deceive or be deceived” in exactly the same way. For this rea-
son, several philosophers have noted that the agreement of a number of
experts on a topic can be an important indicator of accuracy (see, e.g.,
Goldman, 1987, p. 122; Salmon, 1995, p. 105). This suggests that another
technique for verifying the accuracy of a piece of information is to see if
other information sources corroborate the original source of the informa-
tion (cf. Burbules, 2001, p. 446; Wilkinson et al., 1997, p. 56).20
Notably, however, agreement between information sources is not always
an indication that their information is accurate. It depends on how these
different sources got their information. In particular, if they all got their
information from the same place, then ten sources saying the same thing
is no better evidence than one source saying it. Goldman (2001, p. 101)
refers to such information sources as “nondiscriminating reﬂectors.” In a
similar vein, according to Wachbroit (2000, p. 13), “Wittgenstein in On
Certainty presents the [absurd] image of someone trying to check a story
in a newspaper by buying other copies of the same newspaper and reading
the story again.”
This issue turns out to be especially important on the Internet since it
is so easy for the very same information to be copied by several different
Web sites. For example, in one of the Internet scams reported by Fowler et
al. (2001), the news service Internet Wire posted what turned out to be a
fraudulent press release about the Emulex Corporation. The inaccurate
information in this press release was then quickly picked up by several other
news services, such as Bloomberg, CBS Marketwatch, and Dow Jones. As a
result, those investors that did try to verify the accuracy of the information
by checking multiple sources still ended up being misled.
The same sort of replication occurs with consumer health information.
For example, over thirty different Web sites (including the National Library
of Medicine, 2002) provide the same information word for word on how
to treat children with fever. In this case, the information seems to be accu-
rate. However, the fact that all of these sites corroborate each other still does
nothing to help us verify that the information is accurate. Agreement be-
tween sources should not increase our degree of conﬁdence in the accura-
cy of a piece of information unless those sources are independent (cf.
Giedymin, 1963, p. 291).21
Of course, information sources do not always agree with each other. In
fact, it is fairly easy to ﬁnd conﬂicting information (e.g., about the height
of the Eiffel Tower) from different sources on the Internet (cf. Burbules,
2001, p. 452). If sources do conﬂict, then people simply have to determine
which source is more reliable (or use some of the other techniques for
verifying the accuracy of the information).
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What They Testify To: Plausibility and Support
Library and information scientists emphasize that people should con-
sider who the source of the information is when trying to verify its accura-
cy. Philosophers, however, are much more likely to emphasize that people
should look at what the information is. In particular, people are advised to
consider the plausibility of a claim and the reasons offered in support of
the claim.22
In addition to knowing about the reliability of the source, an informa-
tion seeker typically knows many other things about the world that should
be taken into account. If it is very unlikely that a piece of information is
accurate given everything else that we know about the topic in question,
then we should be inclined to think that the information is inaccurate (cf.
Lipton, 1998, p. 25). As Hume (1748/1977, p. 75) puts it, “the evidence,
resulting from the testimony, admits of a diminution, greater or less, in
proportion as the fact is more or less unusual” (cf. Locke 1690/1975, p.
663).23  So, for example, a Web site that depicts a city in Minnesota “as a
tropical paradise” (Piper, 2000) is immediately suspect.
In addition to considering the plausibility of the claim, philosophers
emphasize that people need to consider the reasons (if any) that an infor-
mation source offers in support of the claim (see, e.g., Goldman, 1999, pp.
130–160; Goldman, 2001, pp. 93–94).24  The reasons offered often can
provide the best evidence for the accuracy of the claim. This is certainly how
things are supposed to work in science and mathematics, for example. If a
mathematician wants to determine whether a mathematical claim is true,
she is not going to start by checking the credentials of the person making
the claim. She is going to check the proof that this person has given.
Under ideal circumstances, this is the sort of evidence that people
would use to verify the accuracy of information. However, once again, peo-
ple will not always have sufﬁcient expertise to evaluate the plausibility of a
claim or the reasons offered in support of the claim (cf. Goldman, 2001,
p. 94).25  This may explain why library and information scientists have not
focused on this particular technique for verifying the accuracy of informa-
tion. In those cases where people lack sufﬁcient expertise, they will have to
fall back on more indirect evidence of accuracy or inaccuracy (e.g., con-
sidering who testiﬁes and how they testify).
How They Testify: Presentation
In addition to who testiﬁes and what they testify to, Hume (1748/1977,
p. 75) notes that people should pay attention to the “manner of their de-
livering their testimony.” How a witness testiﬁes is often indicative of the
reliability of this witness (cf. section 4 above).26
Numerous features of Web sites proposed as indicators of accuracy fall
into this category. For example, does the Web site engage in any advertis-
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ing? Advertising may indicate a lack of objectivity (cf. Alexander & Tate,
1999, p. 27). The idea is that the desire to sell products might override the
desire to tell the truth. Also, does the Web site contain any spelling or gram-
matical errors? Such mistakes may indicate a lack of concern for quality and
accuracy (cf. Wilkinson et al., 1997, p. 57; Cooke, 1999, p. 61): The idea is
that if someone is careful enough to get the spelling right, she is more likely
to be careful enough to get the facts right. Finally, does the Web site cite
authoritative references (see, e.g., Ambre et al., 1997; Cooke, 1999, p. 61)?
These are just a few of the features of Web sites that have been proposed
as indicators of accuracy in the published guidelines for evaluating infor-
mation. Not enough space is available here to give an exhaustive list. How-
ever, it is possible to identify three general constraints that indicators of
accuracy must satisfy.27
First, an indicator of accuracy clearly must be correlated with informa-
tion being accurate. In other words, a Web site that displays an indicator
of accuracy (e.g., lack of advertising) must be more likely to contain accu-
rate information than a Web site that does not display that indicator (cf.
Fallis, 2000, p. 307). For example, Fallis and Frické (2002, p. 76) found that
a Web site with accurate health information was over three times more likely
to display the Health on the Net Foundation’s (2002a) HONcode logo than
a Web site with inaccurate health information.
Unfortunately, it is not clear that the features of Web sites that are usu-
ally proposed as indicators of accuracy are really correlated with accuracy.
For one thing, most of the published guidelines for evaluating information
are not based on empirical data. Instead, these guidelines are often based
on surveys of “Web experts” (see, e.g., Ambre et al., 1997; Wilkinson et al.,
1997). However, it is not clear that the features of Web sites that these “Web
experts” believe to be indicators of accuracy really are indicators of accu-
racy. Even worse, in at least some cases, these guidelines have “clearly drawn
from one another” (cf. Burbules, 2001, p. 445). In other words, they are
nondiscriminating reﬂectors (cf. section 5 above).
An empiricist such as Hume, however, would certainly insist on basing
such guidelines on empirical data. For example, with respect to testimony
in general, Hume (1748/1977, p. 75) says that “the reason, why we place
any credit in witnesses and historians, is not derived from any connexion,
which we perceive a priori, between testimony and reality, but because we
are accustomed to ﬁnd a conformity between them.” Unfortunately, the few
studies (see, e.g., Grifﬁths & Christensen, 2000; Fallis & Frické, 2002; Kunst
et al., 2002) that have empirically tested the features of Web sites that are
usually proposed as indicators of accuracy have not found them to be cor-
related with accuracy. According to Kathleen Grifﬁths and Helen Christen-
sen (2000, p. 1515), “currently popular criteria for evaluating the quality
of Web sites were not indicators of content quality.”
Second, people must put the right amount of faith in an indicator of
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accuracy (cf. Hume, 1748/1977, p. 75). In other words, they need to pro-
portion their belief to the evidence. If people do not put the right amount
of faith in an indicator of accuracy, they can still end up being too credu-
lous (or too skeptical).
Indicators of accuracy are rarely guarantees of accuracy (cf. Hume,
1748/1977, p. 74). As a result, there is usually plenty of room for people to
overestimate the degree to which an indicator of accuracy is actually cor-
related with accuracy. Unfortunately, the published guidelines for evaluat-
ing information do not tell people how much faith to put in the features
of Web sites that are usually proposed as indicators of accuracy. Of course,
since their recommendations are not based on empirical data, it is not clear
how they could do so.28
Third, an indicator of accuracy must be correlated with accuracy in a
“robust” way. In particular, it must be difﬁcult for the author of a Web site
to “fake” an indicator of accuracy.
James Perry (1985, p. 251) once made the tongue-in-cheek suggestion
that “the presence of a colon in the title of a paper is the primary correlate
of scholarship.” While titular colonicity is almost certainly not correlated
with accuracy, it does provide a nice example of something that is deﬁnite-
ly not correlated with accuracy in a “robust” way. This is because it is very
easy for an author to put a colon in the title of her paper to gain credibility
even if her information is inaccurate. As Perry (1986, p. 177) notes, “when
an evaluation technique has been developed and tested, it will become fa-
miliar to the evaluatees as well as the evaluators. Thus, its utility will decrease
as evaluatees change their practices to gain higher evaluations” (cf. Bur-
bules, 2001, p. 445). In other words, even if titular colonicity were highly
correlated with information being accurate, it would probably not remain
correlated for long.
The same sort of worry arises with respect to indicators of accuracy on
the Internet. Many Web sites containing inaccurate information might sim-
ply be following the suggestions from Fogg et al. (2001) on “what makes Web
sites credible,” for example. In fact, it should be noted that some Web sites
containing inaccurate information do not simply try to look reputable. They
actually try to look like somebody else. For example, in one of the Internet
scams reported by Fowler et al. (2001), a Web site was designed to look like
the Bloomberg Web site to fool investors. Interestingly enough, such Web
sites are commonly referred to as “counterfeit sites” (cf. Piper, 2000).
Even so, it is possible for indicators to be correlated with accuracy in a
“robust” way (cf. Fallis & Frické, 2002, p. 78). The author of a Web site needs
to do something that she would be unable to do (or at least would be very
unlikely to do) if her information were inaccurate (cf. Goldman, 1999, pp.
108–109). In other words, the author needs to signal that her information
is accurate. For example, identifying oneself as the author of a Web site
using a digital certiﬁcate (cf. Froomkin, 1996) can be an effective signal if one
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has “such credit and reputation in the eyes of mankind, as to have a great
deal to lose in case of . . . being detected in any falsehood” (Hume, 1748/
1977, p. 78).
The general properties of such signals have been studied extensively
in the literature on game theory (see, e.g., Spence, 1974; Baird et al., 1994,
pp. 122–158). For example, just as the quality of information on the Inter-
net varies, the quality of a product typically varies from supplier to supplier.
Some suppliers sell high-quality products and other suppliers sell low-quality
products. Unfortunately, consumers often cannot tell the high-quality prod-
ucts from the low-quality products just by looking at them. Such situations
are referred to as “games of asymmetric information,” where the consum-
ers are the uninformed players and the suppliers are the informed players.
In such situations, suppliers that sell high-quality products would like
to send a signal that would allow consumers to distinguish them from the
suppliers that sell low-quality products. For something to be an effective
signal, however, two conditions must be satisﬁed: ﬁrst, for the low-quality
suppliers, the cost of sending the signal must outweigh the beneﬁt; second,
for the high-quality suppliers, the beneﬁt of sending the signal must out-
weigh the cost. Under most circumstances, this means that it must cost low-
quality suppliers more to send the signal than it costs high-quality suppli-
ers. If the cost is the same for everybody to send the signal, then all suppliers
would make the same decision about whether to send the signal.
This game theoretic analysis can be directly applied to indicators of
accuracy on the Internet. This is because people seeking information on
the Internet are clearly involved in a game of asymmetric information. They
often cannot tell just by looking whether the information on a Web site is
accurate. Of course, people are not always literally buying the information
that they ﬁnd on the Internet. However, they are deciding how much of
their conﬁdence to invest in this information. In addition, the authors of
Web sites typically beneﬁt when people invest conﬁdence in their claims.
Using this game theoretic analysis, we can now say more precisely why
titular colonicity is not a good indicator of accuracy. Since putting a colon in
the title of a paper or a Web site costs everybody the same amount, titular
colonicity does not allow people to distinguish sources with accurate infor-
mation from sources with inaccurate information. Similarly, since automat-
ic spelling and grammar checkers are readily available, the cost of eliminat-
ing spelling and grammatical errors is unlikely to outweigh the beneﬁt to an
author of having more people believe that her information is accurate.
Notably, changes in technology can have an effect on what will be an
effective signal. For example, affordable color photocopying has made it
more cost-effective for counterfeiters to include many of the old signals of
authentic currency (e.g., green ink). As a result, the United States Treasury
has had to come up with some new signals (see Bureau of Engraving and
Printing, 2002). Similarly, some of the indicators of accuracy that worked
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in the world of print information (e.g., the professional look of a document)
may not work as well in the world of electronic information.
Verifiability of Information
Several techniques for verifying the accuracy of information have been
discussed in the preceding sections. However, notably, while it will be feasi-
ble to verify the accuracy of some pieces of information, it will be extreme-
ly difﬁcult (if not impossible) to verify the accuracy of other pieces of in-
formation. In other words, some information is veriﬁable and some
information is not.
The distinction between veriﬁable information and nonveriﬁable in-
formation is commonly made in the literature on game theory. For exam-
ple, Baird et al. (1994, p. 89) note that “some information is veriﬁable; that
is, it can be readily checked once it is revealed. For example, the combina-
tion to a safe is veriﬁable information. The combination either opens the
safe or it does not. Other information is nonveriﬁable. An employer wants
to know whether a guard who was hired was vigilant. The employer might
be able to draw inferences from some events, such as whether a thief was
successful or was caught, but such information may not be available and,
even if it is available, may not be reliable. Even a lazy guard may catch a thief,
and a thief may outwit even the most vigilant guard.” Basically, a piece of
information is veriﬁable if and only if it is easy to determine whether the
information is accurate or inaccurate.29
This characterization provided by Baird et al. captures some of the
essential aspects of veriﬁable information. For instance, the veriﬁability of
a piece of information is independent of the accuracy of the information.
The claim that 8–11–64 is the combination to the safe is veriﬁable wheth-
er or not 8–11–64 really is the combination. On the one hand, if you try 8–
11–64 and the safe opens, then you have veriﬁed that it is the combination.
On the other hand, if you try 8–11–64 a few times and the safe does not
open, then you have pretty much veriﬁed that it is not the combination.30
Similarly, the claim that the guard is vigilant is nonveriﬁable whether or not
the guard really is vigilant. However, a few important subtleties are hidden
by (though not inconsistent with) this characterization.
First, this characterization suggests that either a piece of information
is veriﬁable or it is not. However, veriﬁability is something that comes in
degrees. In fact, it is easy to ﬁnd pieces of information that fall at various
different points on the continuum of veriﬁability. For example, the claim
that the safe is gunmetal gray is somewhat easier to verify than is the com-
bination of the safe. Also, the claim that the guard is a descendent of Char-
lemagne is much harder to verify than is the vigilance of the guard. As a
result, we should really speak of the veriﬁability of information rather than
just veriﬁable versus nonveriﬁable information.
In general, the veriﬁability of a piece of information can be measured
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in terms of how much it costs to determine whether or not the informa-
tion is accurate. So, for example, the more time and energy that a person
must expend to verify a piece of information, the less veriﬁable that infor-
mation is. Of course, in some cases, it may not even be possible to verify a
particular piece of information no matter how much time and energy an
individual is willing to expend.
Second, this characterization suggests that the veriﬁability of a piece
of information is the same regardless of who is trying to verify it. However,
the veriﬁability of a piece of information depends on the circumstances and
capabilities of the individual who is trying to verify it. It will cost you a lot
more time and energy to check the combination if the safe is in New York
and you are in Los Angeles than it would cost you if you were in the same
room with the safe.31  Similarly, it is much easier for a trained physicist to
verify a claim about the behavior of subatomic particles than it is for a lay-
person to verify the same claim.
Finally, this characterization suggests that the veriﬁability of a piece of
information is static. However, it is sometimes possible for people to increase
the veriﬁability of a piece of information (cf. Goldman, 1999, pp. 108–109).
For example, it becomes much easier to determine whether or not the
guard is vigilant if we install a video camera to monitor the guard. As I ex-
plain below, this fact turns out to be important as we try to deal with the
problem of inaccurate information.
Increasing the Verifiability of Information
Library and information scientists have primarily responded to the
problem of inaccurate information on the Internet by teaching people how
to evaluate information (see, e.g., Alexander & Tate, 1999; Cooke, 1999).
Since it is ultimately up to people themselves to decide whether to believe
what they read on the Internet (cf. Cerf, 2002), people should certainly
receive instruction about what features of Web sites are indicative of accu-
racy (and about how indicative these features are). Unfortunately, this is
not a complete solution to the problem. This is because people do not al-
ways apply the techniques for verifying the accuracy of information even
when they know how.
People have to act on numerous beliefs to get through their daily lives,
but they only have a limited amount of time and energy to expend verify-
ing the accuracy of these beliefs. John Hardwig (1985, p. 335) is not unique
when he says that “though I can readily imagine what I would have to do to
obtain evidence that would support any one of my beliefs, I cannot imag-
ine being able to do this for all of my beliefs. I believe too much; there is
too much relevant evidence (much of it available only after extensive, spe-
cialized training); intellect is too small and life too short.” Thus, it is not
surprising that Gunther Eysenbach and Christian Köhler (2002, p. 576)
found that people seeking health information on the Internet rarely inves-
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tigate who the source of the information is even though they believe this
to be an important indicator of accuracy.
Fortunately, teaching people how to evaluate information is not the only
way that information professionals can try to deal with the problem of in-
accurate information. In addition, we can try to make it easier for people
to verify the accuracy of information on the Internet.32  In other words,
instead of just trying to change the people who are seeking information (by
teaching them how to evaluate information), we also can try to increase the
veriﬁability of the information that they seek. If it takes less time and ener-
gy to verify the accuracy of information, then people will be more likely to
do so (cf. Fallis, 2000, pp. 311–312).
The United States Treasury has adopted just this type of strategy in its
efforts to make sure that people can distinguish authentic currency from
counterfeit currency. The treasury does not only produce brochures and
videos to teach people how to distinguish authentic currency from coun-
terfeit currency. The government also tries to print currency that is easy to
authenticate (see Bureau of Engraving and Printing, 2002). Security fea-
tures (watermarks, color-shifting ink, concentric ﬁne-line printing, polymer
security threads, etc.) that are fairly easy for people to detect (and that are
fairly difﬁcult for counterfeiters to reproduce) are added to currency itself.
Notably, increasing the veriﬁability of information may actually be some-
what more cost-effective than teaching people how to evaluate informa-
tion.33  Each person who needs to verify the accuracy of a piece of infor-
mation has to expend energy to acquire and to apply these new skills.
However, only one person (e.g., the author) has to expend energy to make
the information more veriﬁable. For example, only one video camera must
be installed even though there may be several people who are interested
in whether or not the guard is vigilant. As a result, even if the author has to
expend more energy to make the information more veriﬁable than an in-
dividual has to expend to acquire and to apply new evaluation skills, less
energy will often be expended overall.
Techniques for Increasing the Verifiability
of Information
Several techniques for verifying the accuracy of information have been
discussed in the preceding sections. Information professionals can make
information more veriﬁable simply by making it easier for people to apply
these techniques. Of course, it often will be easier for the authors of Web
sites to increase the veriﬁability of information because, like the United
States Treasury when it comes to currency, they have more direct control
over the information. Also, since the veriﬁability of a piece of information
can depend on the circumstances and capabilities of the individual who is
trying to verify it, techniques for increasing the veriﬁability of information
often may need to be tailored to particular audiences. Even so, informa-
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tion professionals can do much to make the information that they supply
to users more veriﬁable.34
The basic idea behind making information more veriﬁable is to give
people easier access to evidence (cf. Fallis, 1999). This can be direct evi-
dence of the accuracy of the information, such as the results of empirical
studies on the effectiveness of a medical treatment (cf. section 6 above).
However, this also can be indirect evidence of the accuracy of the informa-
tion, such as the medical credentials of the individual promoting the treat-
ment (cf. sections 4, 5, and 7 above).
The main way that information professionals can make information
more veriﬁable is by organizing information (cf. Goldman, 1999, p. 163).
For example, this makes it easier for people to ﬁnd further evidence rele-
vant to the topic that they are interested in (cf. section 6 above).35  Also,
this makes it easier for people to consult other sources on this topic to ﬁnd
out if they corroborate the original source (cf. section 5 above).
In addition to organizing information (e.g., by maintaining metadata
about the content of information), information professionals can make
information more veriﬁable by maintaining metadata about the context in
which information was created and disseminated (cf. Ketelaar, 1997). This
makes it easier for people to identify and judge the reliability of the source
of the information (cf. section 4 above). It also makes it easier for people
to identify and judge the reliability of the methodology that was used to
create the information (cf. Giedymin, 1963, p. 289). A related strategy is
to promote interactivity on the Internet (cf. Goldman, 1999, pp. 165–166).
For example, if the e-mail address of the author of a Web site is provided,
people can request speciﬁc information that might clear up worries about
the accuracy of the information on the Web site.
Another important way to increase the veriﬁability of information on
the Internet is to simply point people toward the accurate information. For
example, information professionals have developed portals (or gateways),
such as the Internet Scout Project (2003a) and Blue Web’n (see SBC Paciﬁc Bell
2002), that provide links to Web sites that have been reviewed for quality.36
The fact that these Web sites have been selected by experts serves as an
indication of accuracy. As Alison Cooke (1999, p. 39) puts it, “this relieves
the user of much of the work in ﬁltering potentially useful sources from
the vast quantities of dross available via the Internet” (cf. Burbules, 2001,
p. 447). In other words, such portals provide the same epistemic beneﬁt
on the Internet that collection management has long provided in libraries
(cf. Atkinson, 1996).
Of course, simply creating such portals is not all that needs to be done
to increase the veriﬁability of information. First, such portals need to be
publicized. People cannot take advantage of these portals to ﬁnd accurate
information if they are not aware of them. Second, such portals need to
publish their selection criteria (see, e.g., Internet Scout Project, 2003b).
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Third, information professionals need to develop systems that allow peo-
ple to “cross-search” several portals at one time (see Worsfold, 1998, p.
1484). Because the construction of such portals is so labor-intensive, a sin-
gle portal tends to include a fairly limited number of resources as compared
with general-purpose search engines (see Worsfold, 1998, p. 1484).
Information professionals also can make information more veriﬁable
by improving the indicators of accuracy. First, we can make it easier for
people to check for these indicators of accuracy. For example, Susan Price
and William Hersh (1999) have created a computer program that essen-
tially automates the published guidelines for evaluating information on the
Internet. The software checks Web sites for the proposed indicators of ac-
curacy rather than a person having to do this manually. This is especially
useful for those indicators, such as the number of other Web sites that link
to a Web site, that are not immediately observable features of Web sites.
Second, we can create better indicators of accuracy. In other words, we
can increase the degree to which existing indicators are correlated with
accuracy. For example, an Internet news service, already considered a reli-
able source of information, might raise its editorial standards. Increasing
the degree to which indicators are correlated with accuracy makes it more
cost-effective for people to check Web sites for these indicators (cf. Fallis,
2000, p. 311).
In addition to improving existing indicators, we also can create brand-
new indicators of accuracy. For example, the HONcode logo was created
by the Health on the Net Foundation to be an indicator of accuracy. Only
Web sites that abide by this foundation’s code of conduct for publishing
quality medical information are allowed to display this logo. In addition,
people can simply click on the logo to conﬁrm that a particular Web site is
in compliance with the code of conduct.
Of course, simply creating such indicators of accuracy is not all that
needs to be done to increase the veriﬁability of information. First, such
indicators of accuracy need to be publicized. People cannot take advantage
of these indicators of accuracy if they are not aware of them (or of how
much faith to put in them). Second, as noted in section 7 above, such indi-
cators of accuracy must be difﬁcult to fake. For example, unlike many
awards for quality on the Internet, it would be fairly difﬁcult for the author
of a Web site with inaccurate health information to display the HONcode
logo. The Health on the Net Foundation (2002b) has procedures in place
that are designed to prevent Web sites that do not comply with their code
of conduct from displaying this logo.37
Finally, a couple of somewhat less effective ways of dealing with the
problem of inaccurate information on the Internet should at least be men-
tioned. First, the authors of Web pages can, and probably should, employ
practices that make it more likely that their information is accurate. For
instance, the author of a Web page might only make claims that have been
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corroborated by at least two independent sources (cf. Connell & Tipple,
1999, p. 363). Since there would then be less inaccurate information on the
Internet, such practices would make it somewhat less likely that people will
be misled. However, such practices by themselves do not make it easier for
people to determine whether information is accurate. In other words, sim-
ply increasing the accuracy of information is not the same as increasing the
veriﬁability of information. To increase the veriﬁability of information, the
increased accuracy has to be tied to some observable feature of Web sites,
such as the HONcode logo.
Second, the inaccurate information could simply be removed from the
Internet. In other words, we could impose complete editorial control on
the Internet. If inaccurate information is not there, then people cannot be
misled by it. Also, in that case, information on the Internet would be easi-
er to verify because the mere fact that the information is on the Internet
would be a good indication that it is accurate. However, it is not clear that
this strategy would be either feasible (cf. Bruce, 2000, p. 102) or ethical (cf.
Doyle, 2001). But in addition, it is not clear that this strategy would really
help people to acquire true beliefs. John Stuart Mill (1859/1978) has fa-
mously pointed out that there are epistemic costs to restricting access to
information. First, since human beings are fallible, some accurate informa-
tion also would be removed. Second, having access to many points of view
(even if many of them turn out to be inaccurate) is essential if people are
to acquire justiﬁed beliefs. Thus, we should not focus on getting rid of the
inaccurate information but rather on making it easier for people to identi-
fy it (cf. Wachbroit, 2000, p. 10).
Conclusion
As Floridi (2002a) and Herold (2001) have suggested, a lot of work in
philosophy is relevant to issues of concern to LIS. In this paper, I have
showed how work in the epistemology of testimony is relevant to the issue
of how to verify the accuracy of recorded information. In particular, I have
argued that this work provides a useful conceptual framework for our ef-
forts in LIS to deal with the problem of inaccurate information. However,
it should certainly be noted that epistemology is not the only area of phi-
losophy that is relevant to this issue.
A number of people (e.g., Hardwig, 1994; Shapin, 1994; Burbules, 2001,
pp. 450–453) have pointed out that there is an important ethical dimen-
sion to the issue of how to verify the accuracy of recorded information.
Whenever we rely on someone’s testimony, we are putting our trust in this
individual. This individual has a moral responsibility not to betray this trust.
In fact, in at least two respects, the moral character of the authors of
Web sites is relevant to the issue of how to verify the accuracy of informa-
tion. First of all, the authors of Web sites certainly have a moral obligation
to testify sincerely.38  However, they also have a moral obligation to testify
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only when they are in a position to know the fact that they are testifying to
(cf. Hardwig, 1994, pp. 88–89). Failing to live up to this obligation is a form
of negligence. For example, it might be the case that the author of a Web
site “ought to have known” that a particular treatment for a child with a fever
was not safe and effective. The problem for people using the Internet is to
identify those authors who are living up to these moral obligations (cf. sec-
tion 4 above).
Of course, it is not just the moral character of authors that is relevant
to the issue of how to verify the accuracy of information. Given their spe-
cial role in selecting and organizing information sources, information pro-
fessionals also have moral obligations. Whenever we rely on a piece of re-
corded information, we are trusting that the information professional who
has provided that information has done her job. For example, we trust that
she has made sure that we will ﬁnd further information that is relevant to
the accuracy of this piece of information, such as a retraction (cf. Fallis,
2000, p. 312). In addition, information professionals arguably have a mor-
al obligation to encourage ethical behavior on the part of authors of Web
sites (cf. Hardwig, 1994, p. 91).39
But while ethical considerations are certainly critical to the epistemol-
ogy of testimony, they are not the whole story. In other words, it is not pos-
sible to reduce the epistemology of testimony to ethics as it seems that
Steven Shapin (1994) would like to do.40  When an individual testiﬁes falsely,
it is not always the result of a moral failing. As Peter Lipton (1998, p. 10)
puts it, “we may be quite convinced that our informant is an honest chap,
yet still wonder whether to believe what he says.” For example, a Web site
might promote an ineffective treatment for a child with a fever because of
an honest mistake and not because the author has been insincere or negli-
gent. The epistemology of testimony encompasses all of the considerations
that are relevant to the issue of how to verify the accuracy of recorded in-
formation.
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Notes
1. For an extensive discussion of the history and scope of the philosophy of information, see
Floridi 2002b.
2. Fallis (2000), Goldman (1999), Thagard (2001), Wachbroit (2000), and the articles in the
special issue of Social Epistemology, 16(1) on “Social Epistemology and Information Science”
are some of the exceptions.
3. Such an appeal to work in epistemology is in line with Shera’s (1970, p. 87) call for inter-
disciplinarity in LIS research. Work in game theory is also an area that Floridi (2002b, p.
139) explicitly had in mind as being relevant to PI. As Floridi (2002a, p. 41) notes, LIS
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does have a broader scope than epistemology. Even so, many of its main concerns are clearly
epistemological (cf. Shera, 1970, pp. 82–110).
4. Paul Thagard (2001, pp. 480–481), however, has pointed out that at least some features
of the Internet can promote accuracy (e.g., it is much easier to quickly correct errors on
the Internet than in print sources).
5. Ironically enough, library and information scientists themselves have put a lot of inaccu-
rate information on the Internet for the purposes of research (cf. Hernon, 1995) and teach-
ing (cf. Piper, 2000).
6. Giedymin (1963) applies work in the epistemology of testimony to the problem of verify-
ing the accuracy of historical documents.
7. Locke (1975/1690, p. 663) and Goldman (1999, p. 123) agree with Hume that putting
the right amount of faith in the evidence is the best way to maximize truth possession.
8. Similarly, if the evidence that the claim is inaccurate is greater, then we should be inclined
to think that the claim is inaccurate.
9. The amount of evidence that we should consider depends on how sure we need to be of
the accuracy of the information (cf. Burbules, 2001, p. 446). Philosophers typically say that
this ultimately depends on what the cost of being misled by inaccurate information is in a
particular case (cf. Smith, C., 2002, p. 71).
10. See, for example, Goldman (1999, pp. 59–65) for a discussion of the correspondence the-
ory of truth.
11. In addition, philosophers often require that these true beliefs be justiﬁed (cf. Goldman,
1999, pp. 23–24).
12. As Peter Lipton (1998, p. 6) puts it, “the problem of determining which testimony to ac-
cept and which to reject . . . presupposes a distinction between what is believed (or at least
asserted) and what is the case.”
13. Bertram Bruce (2000) applies Kaufmann’s notion of “dialectical reading” to the Internet.
14. For that matter, if our goal is to acquire true beliefs, we also are interested in the acces-
sibility and comprehensibility of the information (cf. Berland et al., 2001).
15. Goldman (2001) is explicitly concerned with determining which experts you should trust,
but what he says applies equally well to determining which Web sites you should trust.
16. As Hume (1977 /1748, p. 75) might put it, does the information source “have an interest
in what they afﬁrm”? Also, notably, bias can result in unintentionally (cf. Goldman, 2001,
pp. 104–105) as well as intentionally (cf. Fowler et al., 2001) inaccurate testimony.
17. Even with all these techniques, it still may be difﬁcult to determine the reliability of a lot
of potentially useful sources of information on the Internet.
18. If someone intentionally gives inaccurate testimony, her goal is not necessarily to mislead.
For example, mapmakers often include small inaccuracies to protect themselves against
copyright infringement (cf. Monmonier, 1991, pp. 49–51).
19. Goldman (1999, p. 123) further subdivides this second question into worries about (a)
opportunity and (b) competence. In addition, contextualists have pointed out that we
might be misled simply because we have a different (e.g., higher) standard of knowledge
than the person who is testifying (cf. Smith, C., 2002).
20. The published guidelines for evaluating information on the Internet do not tend to em-
phasize this technique.
21. As Goldman (2001, p. 101) points out, what is required here is only conditional indepen-
dence and not full independence. If two information sources are reliable, then their re-
ports will be correlated with each other simply because both their reports will be correlat-
ed with the truth.
22. Gwendolen, for example, relies on such direct evidence of accuracy when she says that
“their explanations appear to be quite satisfactory, especially Mr. Worthing’s. That seems
to me to have the stamp of truth upon it” (Wilde, 2003/1895).
23. It is interesting to note that, all other things being equal, it is actually the more surprising
claims that are more likely to be disseminated. This occurs even with extremely reliable
information sources. For example, as Steven Landsburg (1999) notes, “given two papers
that have both survived the vetting process, editors [of academic journals] tend to prefer
the more surprising, which means that on average they prefer the one that’s wrong.”
24. In addition, people need to consider how an information source responds to reasons that
have been offered by others against the claim (cf. Goldman, 1999, p. 142).
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25. This can happen even in science and mathematics. For example, a mathematician with a
particular area of expertise may not be qualiﬁed to check the proof of a mathematical claim
in another area.
26. Cecily, for example, relies on such indirect evidence of accuracy when she says that “I am
more than content with what Mr. Moncrieff said. His voice alone inspires one with abso-
lute credulity” (Wilde, 2003/1895).
27. Fallis (2000) shows how these constraints on indicators of accuracy can be formalized us-
ing Goldman’s (1999) theory of knowledge acquisition. Also, it is important to note that
these constraints apply to the issue of who testiﬁes as well as to the issue of how they testify.
28. For each indicator of accuracy that was identiﬁed in their empirical study, Fallis and Frické
(2002, p. 77) report how much more likely the indicator is to be on an accurate Web site
than on an inaccurate Web site.
29. For a piece of information to be veriﬁable, it does not have to be the case that we can ever
know for sure that it is accurate (or inaccurate). With the possible exception of mathe-
matical facts, there will always be some room for doubt.
30. A piece of inaccurate information that is veriﬁable is sometimes said to be falsiﬁable.
31. The veriﬁability of a piece of information can vary with time as well as location (cf. Gold-
man, 2001, pp. 106–107).
32. In a similar vein, Goldman (1999, p. 108) asks “what can truthful speakers do to make their
reports more credible to hearers than they otherwise might be?”
33. Of course, this is not to say that information professionals should not also be teaching
people how to evaluate information.
34. It should be noted that, with the exception of removing inaccurate information and cre-
ating portals to accurate information, none of the techniques that I discuss in this section
requires information professionals to make judgments about the accuracy of speciﬁc pieces
of information.
35. Goldman (1999, pp. 169–170) also points out how hypertext can allow people to quickly
access further information on their topic.
36. Some of these portals, such as the Digital Library of Information Science and Technology (2002)
and the Cleveland Digital Library (see Cleveland State University, 2002), are known as dig-
ital libraries, and they collect information resources as well as provide links to other infor-
mation resources on the Internet. See Cooke, 1999, pp. 34–37 for a list of other portals.
37. Of course, it would be even better if Web sites that displayed this logo without complying
with the code of conduct were subject to ﬁnancial penalties.
38. Not all would agree, however. For example, Gwendolen asserts that “in matters of grave
importance, style, not sincerity is the vital thing” (Wilde, 2003/1895).
39. The selection role of information professionals also raises another familiar ethical issue
(see, e.g., Wengert, 2001). Namely, when does selection of materials turn into censorship
of materials?
40. For an even more radical view that assigns intrinsic moral value to information itself, see
Floridi (2003).
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